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Foreword
T
his volume is one in a series commissioned by the
American Enterprise Institute to contribute to the
debates over global environmental policy issues.
Until very recently, American environmental policy was
directed toward problems that were seen to be of a purely,
or at least largely, domestic nature. Decisions concerning
emissions standards for automobiles and power plants, for
example, were set with reference to their effect on the qual-
ity of air Americans breathe.
That is no longer the case. Policy makers increasingly
find that debates over environmental standards have be-
come globalized, to borrow a word that has come into fash-
ion in several contexts. Global warming is the most promi-
nent of those issues: Americans now confront claims that
the types of cars they choose to drive, the amount and mix
of energy they consume in their homes and factories, and
the organization of their basic industries all have a direct
effect on the lives of citizens of other countries—and, in
some formulations, may affect the future of the planet itself.
Other issues range from the management of forests,
fisheries, and water resources to the preservation of species
and the search for new energy sources. Not far in the back-
ground of all those new debates, however, are the oldest
subjects of international politics—competition for resources
and competing interests and ideas concerning economic
growth, the distribution of wealth, and the terms of trade.
An important consequence of those developments is
that the arenas in which environmental policy is determinedviii
are increasingly international—not just debates in the U.S.
Congress, rulemaking proceedings at the Environmental
Protection Agency, and implementation decisions by the
states and municipalities, but opaque diplomatic “frame-
works” and “protocols” hammered out in remote locales.
To some, that constitutes a dangerous surrender of national
sovereignty; to others, it heralds a new era of American
cooperation with other nations that is propelled by the re-
alities of an interdependent world. To policy makers them-
selves, it means that familiar questions of the benefits and
costs of environmental rules are now enmeshed with ques-
tions of sovereignty and political legitimacy, of the possi-
bility of large international income transfers, and of the
relations of developed to developing countries.
In short, environmental issues are becoming as much
a question of foreign policy as of domestic policy; indeed,
the Clinton administration has made what it calls “envi-
ronmental diplomacy” a centerpiece of this country’s for-
eign policy.
AEI’s project on global environmental policy includes
contributions from scholars in many academic disciplines
and features frequent lectures and seminars at the Institute’s
headquarters as well as this series of studies. We hope that
the project will illuminate the many complex issues con-
fronting those attempting to strike a balance between en-










fundamental issue is what steps, if any, countries
should take to control greenhouse gas emissions.
The economics literature generally suggests that
there is no reason to panic and take drastic action now to
reduce greenhouse gases. The political economy literature
suggests that such action is infeasible because of the seri-
ous problems in getting countries to cooperate.
This volume argues that the best strategy for address-
ing climate change over the next decade is to help build
institutions that can address climate change in the future.
Those institutions include systems established at the nation-
state level to measure greenhouse gas emissions, to imple-
ment cost-effective approaches for limiting those emissions,
and to enforce those approaches. Over time, supervising
the achievement of those objectives might evolve so that it
would come under the jurisdiction of an international body,
although sovereignty issues would have to be addressed.
That international body would assess greenhouse gas in-
ventories and review national policies and measures.
This study recommends that the developed nations of
the world craft an agreement for the next decade that pro-
vides a slight emission limitation and allows for a series of
case studies. The case studies would allow for the participa-
tion of developing countries.
The case-study approach would take into account the
interests of particular countries. For example, the Scandi-
navian countries, which have already implemented carbon
taxes, could continue on that path, perhaps working on2
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harmonization issues. The United States and other coun-
tries interested in tradable permits or a hybrid system could
use that approach. Other European countries may want to
try a combination of regulation and market-based ap-
proaches. The case studies suggested in this volume under-
score the need to design national institutions. Such national
institutions are crucial if novel market-based mechanisms
are to be implemented effectively.
The appeal of the case-study approach is that it pre-
serves diversity and builds useful institutional experience
and knowledge. The last thing we should be doing now, in
our state of ignorance about the warming problem and
institutional responses, is to narrow the range of response
mechanisms. Thus, the case studies cover a fairly wide range
but focus on the development of cost-effective approaches





ver the next century, our progeny will learn
whether the average global temperature increases
from 1°C to 3.5°C, as has been suggested by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.1 If the ac-
tual change is at the high end of that range, people around
the world will be forced to adapt to potentially major cli-
matic changes associated with the change in temperature.
The choice we have now is how best to address the possibil-
ity of human-induced climate change on a global scale.
The current projections of temperature increase are
based on a widely accepted theory that naturally occurring
gases, such as water vapor and carbon dioxide, help trap
heat in our atmosphere. The retention of heat by those
“greenhouse gases” increases average temperatures by
about 30°C and moderates temperature variations, thereby
allowing life to exist as we know it.2
Human activity, such as burning fossil fuels, deforesta-
tion, and raising livestock, has greatly increased the amount
of carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases
released into the atmosphere. Although atmospheric con-
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group
I (1996).
2. See Tucker (1997). The major greenhouse gases include water va-
por, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone.4
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centrations of greenhouse gases are determined by a com-
plex set of factors, they are correlated with industrializa-
tion. Greenhouse gas concentrations have increased more
in the past two centuries than in the preceding 10,000
years.3 Scientists theorize that further increases in the con-
centration of greenhouse gases from human activity will
allow less heat to escape the earth’s atmosphere, thus in-
creasing average global temperature.4
Great debate arises over the likely effects of rising glo-
bal temperatures. Indeed, the concern about rising green-
house gas concentrations stems not so much from their
impact on global mean temperatures as from their impact
on climatic changes that affect humans, animals, plants,
and ecosystems. For example, regional weather patterns
could undergo major changes, including the amount of
rainfall, temperature variation, and storm patterns.
Some people have expressed concerns about extinc-
tion of species through habitat loss and damage to ecosys-
tems, the loss of land due to sea level rise, and the increased
incidence of tropical disease and natural disasters. More-
over, some are concerned that the changes in climate could
lead to some unpleasant “surprises,” such as a shift in ocean
currents that could alter regional climates, possibly freez-
ing Western Europe.5 At the same time, some modeling
predicts that specific regions could benefit from the warm-
ing, such as colder regions of Canada and Russia, which
would have increased agricultural productivity. If all of that
3. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group
II (1996).
4. Although correlation does not prove causation, historical data show
a positive relationship between temperature and fluctuations in atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide concentrations. For example, glacial records
indicate that carbon dioxide and local temperature rose together at the
end of an ice age 130,000 years ago, then declined concurrently at the
beginning of a new glacial period, and then rose again together 10,000
years ago (Schneider 1990).
5. See Schelling (1992).5
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sounds uncertain, it does so because determining the pre-
cise implications of the changes in global average tempera-
ture is difficult.
Limiting greenhouse gas emissions is far from simple
since they are inevitable byproducts of industrialization.
The numerous sources of greenhouse gas emissions include
all activities that utilize fossil fuels, such as automobile travel.
Moreover, fossil-fuel use is expected to grow rapidly
throughout the world as the developing countries indus-
trialize, especially China, which has large coal reserves.6
Because the sources of rising greenhouse gas concen-
trations are ubiquitous and the consequences of those in-
creased emissions are global, effective mitigation strategies
will require a high degree of international cooperation. If
only a small number of countries agree to limit their emis-
sions of carbon dioxide, the impact of that action is likely
to be small. Yet, getting widespread cooperation is unlikely
in the short term because most developing countries do
not believe that the climate-change issue is a high priority
for them and because they fear that emission controls could
slow their economic development.
Stringent limits on greenhouse gas emissions could
involve major changes in lifestyle for billions of consum-
ers, such as modifying how we heat and light our homes,
what foods we eat, and how we transport ourselves. For
example, consumers may need to use more efficient insu-
lation, light bulbs, appliances, and vehicles. Reducing
greenhouse gas emissions could also involve switching to
energy and power sources such as nuclear power, solar
6. To keep things simple, I use the old nomenclature of developed
country and developing country. A developed country generally re-
fers to an “industrialized” country with a relatively high per capita
income. A developing country refers to a country with a relatively low
per capita income. In thinking about climate change, it is also some-
times useful to identify countries on the verge of becoming developed
or industrialized.6
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power, and natural gas, which release fewer greenhouse
gas emissions per unit of energy.
A fundamental question is what steps, if any, countries
should take to control greenhouse gas concentrations. This
volume answers that question by carefully reviewing the
economics and politics of climate change and then offer-
ing a new policy approach. The analysis accepts the likely
existence of a problem and suggests that the best strategy
for addressing climate change over the next decade is to
help build institutions that can deal with climate change in
the future.7
The development of institutions is necessary because
institutions do not currently exist to address a global envi-
ronmental issue of that kind, if we assume that significant
action is warranted.8 Those institutions include develop-
ing a capacity at the level of the nation-state for measuring
greenhouse gas emissions, implementing cost-effective ap-
proaches for limiting those emissions, and enforcing those
approaches. They also include improvement of the capac-
ity of an international body to assess greenhouse gas inven-
tories and review national policies and measures.
This volume recommends that the developed nations of
the world craft an agreement for the next decade that pro-
vides a slight emission limitation and suggests conducting a
series of case studies. The proposed case studies would help
nurture the development of institutions that could effectively
address the climate-change issue at a reasonable cost. The
volume also recommends a particular market-based ap-
proach for imposing slight limitations on greenhouse gas
emissions in developed countries—either as one of the case
studies or as a general policy if the case-study approach turns
out to be impractical. That market-based approach would
7. See Victor and Salt (1995), Schmalensee (1996), and Stavins
(1997a).
8. The definition of significant is arbitrary. By significant, I mean emis-
sions that do not exceed 1990 levels.7
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involve international tradable permits along with a price
ceiling that limits the costs of control and a price floor that
ensures that the system will be operational.
To develop a strategy for addressing climate change
and to make policy recommendations, it is useful first to
examine the economics and politics of climate change.
After reviewing the basic findings, the volume suggests ar-
eas for research.8
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2
The Economics of Climate Change
T
he economics of global warming is concerned pri-
marily with the costs and benefits of limiting green
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere can
be limited in two ways—by limiting emissions sources or by
enhancing storage capacity through the use of “sinks,” such
as planting forests. Here, costs will typically refer to mitiga-
tion costs. Mitigation costs include costs of limiting sources
of greenhouse gas emissions as well as costs of creating sinks.
The benefit category includes a wide variety of market and
nonmarket factors such as changes in consumer welfare
resulting from impacts on different sectors of the economy,
changes in recreation, and changes in ecosystems.
A variety of ways exist to aggregate costs and benefits
for the purpose of defining desirable policies. One ap-
proach that has been advocated for use in climate change
is the so-called precautionary principle. The precaution-
ary principle essentially says that it is better to be safe than
sorry by erring on the side of caution. Thus, some people
argue that it is better to act now on climate change to avoid
potentially serious consequences later on. But how much
to err on the side of caution? The principle provides little,
if any, guidance.
The precautionary principle is flawed as a criterion
for policy making because it is impossible to err on the9
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side of caution on all problems—even all environmental
problems. The reason is that resources are finite—when
more resources are spent on one serious problem, fewer
resources are available to address other problems. The
challenge, then, is to make a judicious allocation of finite
resources, rather than simply to follow a rule of thumb
such as the precautionary principle. For example, exces-
sive expenditures on the environment could adversely
affect funding for education, disaster relief, and other
worthy concerns.9
Many alternatives to the precautionary principle exist.
Economists, while not in complete agreement on a par-
ticular objective, believe that it is useful to weigh the costs
and benefits in developing a strategy for addressing climate
change. Here, I highlight some important economic con-
siderations for designing that strategy.
The Nature of Costs and Benefits
Timing of Costs and Benefits. The costs will occur early,
while the benefits accrue later on. Climate change is a
problem with a relatively long time scale. If action is taken,
the costs will be incurred when action is taken; in con-
trast, the benefits will accrue more slowly because emis-
sions released now will influence global climate over a
9. While the precautionary principle does not provide a firm basis for
policy, specific decision criteria could provide a justification for acting
on climate now. One such criterion is the so-called minimax regret prin-
ciple, which tries to minimize the chance of a particularly undesirable
outcome. Even when the objective is to maximize expected net ben-
efits, one can make a case for investing in preserving his options if a bad
policy outcome is not easily reversed, as might be the case with climate
change (Arrow and Fisher 1974; Manne and Richels 1992; Chichilnisky
and Heal 1993). As Kolstad (1994) points out, however, the investments
in climate change abatement also have some characteristics of irrevers-
ibility, thus serving as a counterbalance to the potentially irreversible
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions.10
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much longer time scale as greenhouse gases build up in
the atmosphere.10
Uncertainties. Both the costs and benefits of limiting green-
house gas emissions are highly uncertain. Individual cost
estimates are subject to great uncertainties that reflect un-
derlying uncertainties in the availability of different tech-
nologies, their costs, and their effectiveness. Accurate
emissions predictions also depend on estimates of popula-
tion growth, rates of economic growth, the elasticity of
demand for carbon-based fuels, and unforeseen political
events.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change pre-
sents estimates for stabilizing U.S. carbon emissions at
roughly the 1990 level that range from .4 to 2.2 percent of
U.S. gross national product.11 Using 1 percent of GNP as an
order of magnitude estimate for the developed countries
suggests that costs could be in the hundreds of billions of
dollars annually. Schelling has argued that those costs are
affordable in the sense that they are unlikely to have a huge
impact on growth.12 The costs, however, may not be desir-
able if the likely future benefits are small in comparison.
10. The atmospheric “lifetime” of carbon dioxide is roughly 100 years,
which means that about one-third of the carbon dioxide emitted today
will still be in the atmosphere 100 years from now.
11. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group
III (1996). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change cites costs
of U.S. abatement from –1.2 percent to 10.9 percent of GDP, which
underscores the uncertainty of cost estimates. The negative costs, while
possible in principle, are unlikely in practice because they presume rela-
tively high levels of inefficiency in markets that can be corrected with
government intervention.
12. See Schelling (1992). Schelling argues that developed countries
can easily absorb that size loss since a 2 percent reduction in GNP per
capita would mean that a doubling of income per capita would occur in
roughly sixty-two years rather than in sixty years. Alternatively, the re-
duced growth rate would “lower the GNP curve by not much more than
the thickness of a line drawn with a number-two pencil.”11
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Moreover, major shifts in employment could occur as sec-
tors that rely heavily on fossil fuels, such as steel, primary
metals, coal production, and petroleum refining, decline.13
Studies of future benefits do not shed much light on
the benefit-cost comparison because of the difficulty of
quantifying and monetizing benefits. Quantifying benefits
is difficult because of the absence of good data on the re-
gional effects of climate change. Without such data, one
must assume a temperature increase and then examine the
likely regional impacts.14 Measuring potential nonmarket
damages, such as damages to unmanaged ecosystems and
biodiversity, is extremely problematic because they are dif-
ficult to specify in quantitative terms and consumers do
not value them directly.
Distribution of Benefits. The benefits of avoiding climate
change are likely to be unevenly distributed across time
and space. Many small islands are at risk from sea level
rise; on the other hand, Canada and Siberia could benefit
from warmer temperatures.15 Moreover, Mendelsohn finds
that the market impacts on the United States are likely to
be beneficial.16
Not only will some regions benefit more than others,
but the people who will benefit the most from abatement
are those who are vulnerable to climate change—primar-
ily the future poor in developing countries. They will be
more vulnerable to climate change because they will lack
adequate resources and they will be more dependent on
agriculture. In the United States, for example, agriculture
represents only 3 percent of gross domestic product, while
in the developing world the total is closer to 30 percent.17
13. See Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990).
14. See Mendelsohn (1996).
15. See Schelling (1992).
16. See Mendelsohn (1996).
17. See Schelling (1992).12
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It is difficult to predict the precise pattern of benefits
across time. To the extent that demand for environmental
improvements increases with wealth, so too will the demand
for addressing climate change. Yet the nature of concerns
may change over time. For example, current worries about
disruptions in agriculture and increased disease, which are
legitimate concerns now, may be resolved in the future as
technology evolves to address those threats.
Locational Considerations. The location of a particular
source of emissions or sink is not important for total ben-
efits. A ton of carbon dioxide or methane emitted from
the United States has the same impact on climate change
as a ton emitted from China. That property has important
economic and political implications. For example, it means
that decreasing greenhouse gas emissions in developed
countries will have no impact on climate change if there is
a commensurate increase in developing countries.
Additional Benefits. Measures to reduce greenhouse gases
often reduce other pollutants as well and thus yield addi-
tional benefits. Steps to limit greenhouse gases could also
reduce sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,
particulate matter, and tropospheric ozone, thus benefiting
particular regions. The value of those benefits per ton of car-
bon reduced has been estimated to be between $3 and $80
per ton.18 Those benefits should be counted only if they
are truly incremental. Burtraw and Toman argue that those
benefits are likely to be modest.19
Stringency Considerations. Costs increase more than pro-
portionally with the increasing stringency of targets and
18. See Burtraw and Toman (1997). Unless otherwise noted, year
dollars reflect those used in the study cited. Most estimates fall in the
time period 1990 to 1995.
19. See Burtraw and Toman (1997).13
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timetables. Several analyses have shown that climate change
costs increase dramatically as the target reduction in net
greenhouse gas emissions increases. The marginal cost of
control rises from $10 per ton to $80 per ton as reductions
increase from 5 percent to 25 percent.20 In addition, the
timing of reductions can have a critical effect on costs.
Making reductions now can be much more costly than
making reductions later because of the emergence of new
technologies as well as the natural turnover of the capital
stock. Under some stabilization scenarios, it is possible to
reduce mitigation costs by over 80 percent by deferring
most reductions until near the end of the next century.21
Interestingly, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change calls for fairly significant reductions now. That may
not make good economic sense.22 The best economic strat-
egy appears to be to start small and increase the target
gradually, if such increases are warranted on the basis of
the science and economics.23
Strategies to Reduce Abatement Costs
Use of Economic Instruments. Costs could be reduced sub-
stantially by using economic instruments. Table 2–1 com-
pares various command-based systems for achieving targets
with market-based approaches, such as tradable-permit sys-
tems, under various assumptions.24 Both fees and permits
20. See Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1996). That pattern is consis-
tent with others noted in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Working Group III (1996), including studies by Barns,
Edmonds, and Reilly (1992), Martin et al. (1992), Manne (1992),
Oliveira-Martins et al. (1992), and Rutherford (1992).
21. See Manne and Richels (1997).
22. See Manne and Richels (1997).
23. See Nordhaus (1979) and Manne and Richels (1997).
24. The savings are identified as being derived from tradable per-
mits. An alternative interpretation is that the savings result from an
emissions tax–subsidy approach that is revenue neutral.14
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have the potential to reduce costs relative to a command-
and-control system by providing an incentive to search for
the lowest cost reductions first. Those simulations, which
are based on the assumption that markets work efficiently,
suggest that nations could save huge sums of money by mov-
ing to an international tradable-permit system if significant
reductions were required. For example, if the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development coun-
tries were required to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels early
in the twenty-first century, savings relative to the case with
no trading with the rest of the world would range from $10
billion to $300 billion annually. Those savings would rep-
resent about 50 percent of the costs without trading.
Use of Sinks. We could substantially reduce costs by using
sinks. Although we face significant challenges in implement-
ing a carbon sink program as part of a national or interna-
tional greenhouse gas policy, we may realize substantial
savings for a net emissions approach relative to a program
that is limited to reducing energy-related emissions.25 The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicates that
carbon sequestration could cost-effectively contribute 15
percent to 30 percent of the reductions of a net emissions
stabilization program.26 Stavins argues that carbon seques-
tration is best seen as a short-term strategy for reducing
net greenhouse gases because the strategy will eventually
have diminishing returns.27
Recent work suggests that some of the relative advan-
tages of the carbon-sequestration option will be lost if is-
sues related to leakage, measurement, and credible
commitment cannot be fully addressed. For example, moni-
toring the net level of emissions resulting from both sources
25. See Richards et al. (1993) and Stavins (1997b).
26. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group
III (1996).
27. See Stavins (1997b).17
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and sinks will be more difficult and costly. Even when those
additional costs are taken into account, the cost savings of
including sinks, relative to strategies limited to energy
emissions, are likely to be substantial.28
Reducing Distortionary Taxes. We could substantially re-
duce costs by using instruments that generate revenues if
the revenues are used to reduce highly distortionary taxes.
A growing literature suggests that emissions taxes offer sig-
nificant benefits over a comparable system of nonauctioned
tradable permits, provided that the tax revenues are used
to reduce highly inefficient taxes. For example, Parry, Wil-
liams, and Goulder find that the cost of reducing emissions
by 10 percent in the United States is 300 percent higher
when using nonauctioned tradable permits than when us-
ing a carbon tax that recycles revenues.29 They show that a
nonauctioned quota cannot increase efficiency unless the
marginal benefits from reductions of carbon dioxide are
at least $25 per ton of carbon, while a tax that recycles rev-
enues judiciously improves efficiency as long as marginal
benefits are positive. That analysis highlights the need to
consider the revenue and taxation consequences of differ-
ent approaches to limiting greenhouse gases.30
Savings from Economic Approaches. Actual cost savings
from economic approaches are likely to fall far short of
their theoretical potential. That is primarily so because the
design of economic approaches is intimately connected with
28. See Richards (1997). The estimates of the marginal costs of car-
bon removal in the United States range from approximately $10 to $15
per metric ton for relatively small amounts of carbon removal (25 to 75
million tons per year) up to $60 per ton for a program that averages
440 million tons per year. See Richards, Moulton, and Birdsey (1993)
and Moulton and Richards (1990).
29. See Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1996).
30. For a similar analysis of the U.S. acid rain program, see Goulder,
Parry, and Burtraw (1996).18
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politics. For example, in a tradable-permit system, govern-
ments may initially be given the permits with no require-
ment to allocate those permits to private-sector participants.
If governments are central actors in trading, cost savings
are likely to be lower because governments have less of an
incentive to minimize costs than participants in the private
sector. In addition, governments may need to play a cen-
tral role in certain activities, such as the creation of carbon
sinks on government land.
Government behavior could have a dramatic impact
on the performance of the market and hence on the de-
gree of cost savings achieved with a market.31 If a govern-
ment is a major trader, private traders may fear that the
government will be more likely to change the trading rules
to address short-term political concerns. In addition, even
if a government stays on the sidelines, traders may fear that
rule changes will occur that diminish the value or security
of property rights, as occurred with emissions trading in
the United States.32 A government can address that prob-
lem by clearly defining the nature of the property rights.
Good examples include the market for phasing out lead in
gasoline and the market for reducing sulfur dioxide in the
United States.
Defining Emission Baselines. The environmental impacts
of allowing flexible approaches for trading emissions when
emission baselines are poorly defined are questionable. One
of the proposals for reducing the cost of achieving net
greenhouse gas emission reductions is “joint implementa-
tion.”33 Joint implementation refers to a system in which a
country may meet its abatement commitments by financ-
ing emissions reduction or sink augmentation in another
country. In some joint implementation proposals, the coun-
31. See Harrison and Rutherford (1997).
32. See Hahn and Hester (1989) and Foster and Hahn (1995).
33. See Andrasko, Carter, and van der Gaast (1996).19
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try in which greenhouse gas reductions are being made
may not be a participant in an agreement nor have well-
defined emission limits.
Joint implementation has some serious practical defects.
It is frequently very difficult to determine a baseline for
emissions when countries do not have emission limits.34
To award credits to the investing nation for emission re-
ductions, we must calculate how much higher emissions
would have been without the investment. Since develop-
ing nations do not face specific targets, estimating what
would have happened without the project is difficult. In
addition, it is hard to know whether reductions from a
project will lead to any net reductions globally.
Furthermore, negotiations over the environmental
value of each transaction could result in very high transac-
tion costs.35 Such a case-by-case approach makes it easier
for firms and governments to claim net reductions after
merely shifting the distribution of emissions. Parties to those
transactions also have incentives to overstate their environ-
mental benefits so as to receive more credit and to select
projects that are more difficult for an oversight authority
to audit. To counteract those potential biases, the author-
ity charged with giving credits will need to be very careful
in defining criteria for acceptable projects. If the criteria
are stringent, however, that could lead to a program of very
limited scope.
The experience in the United States with emissions trad-
ing suggests that joint implementation is likely to have lim-
ited usefulness because determinations will be on a
case-by-case basis. Moreover, the problems with defining a
baseline are even more significant than those encountered
in some U.S. trading programs.36 By the same token, joint
34. See Harvey and Bush (1997) and Schmalensee (1997).
35. See Jackson (1995).
36. See Hahn and Hester (1989), Foster and Hahn (1995), and Stavins
(1997b).20
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implementation may offer some constructive applications
when emission reductions are reasonably well defined.
Because of the potential problems with defining
baselines, it may be necessary to divide joint implementa-
tion projects in accord with how easily a baseline can be
determined. For example, it is probably easier to define
baselines for some kinds of power plants and methane leak-
age projects than for the planting or preservation of for-
ests. For projects where baseline determination is relatively
easy, it is probably possible to include them in a tradable
permits system or a credit system. For projects where
baseline determination is more difficult, it will be neces-
sary to have more monitoring to ensure that baseline ma-
nipulation does not occur—a measure that increases
transaction costs. For some projects, such as planting a for-
est, the relevant baseline may be too uncertain to provide
a meaningful estimate of likely emission reductions.
While joint implementation has serious defects, it also
has some advantages. One is that the process allows some
experience that is relevant to designing a tradable-permit
system without actually creating that system.37 Another
advantage is that joint implementation is a relatively simple
extension of current policy based on the Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, and thus it is feasible.
Proponents of joint implementation see it as a low-cost
way to reach abatement targets because energy use is often
inefficient in developing countries and the cost of abate-
ment is projected to be low.38 Some also see joint imple-
mentation as an effective way to build support for a climate
agreement in developing countries by giving participants
a financial incentive to develop better inventories, find
37. See Palmisano (1996).
38. On the other hand, Jackson (1995) argues that low and even nega-
tive cost abatement options will be more readily found in developed
countries. That partly depends on the levels of reductions that are re-
quired in the various countries.21
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mitigation opportunities, improve monitoring, and sell re-
ductions to the developed world.
To the extent that joint implementation helps build
institutions and support in developing countries, we should
evaluate the system primarily on those criteria. The best
gloss one can put on joint implementation is that it could
serve as a transitional strategy for developing cost-effective
approaches for addressing climate change. I remain skep-
tical because the problems with establishing a baseline are
significant in many cases.
If the choice were between joint implementation and
no trading with developing countries initially, the choice
would be difficult. But another option that policy makers have
largely ignored exists. That option is to apply the same rules
to all countries in the trading system. In principle, policy
makers could accomplish that by negotiating an initial
allocation of permits that is acceptable to participating
developing countries. Allocating a large number of per-
mits to those countries could, however, encounter politi-
cal resistance as a result of the potentially large resource
transfers required.39
Narrow Agreements. The costs of achieving net green-
house gas reductions increase as the sources covered un-
der an agreement narrow. As more sources and sinks for
greenhouse gas emissions are covered, the potential for
leakage is less. For example, if the effect of an agreement
is simply to transfer tree planting from an area not cov-
ered by an agreement to an area covered by the agree-
ment, that leads to no net reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions.
39. See Schelling (1998). The resource transfer problem can be ad-
dressed by setting initial reduction targets that are modest—a subject I
address below.22
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General Principles
Range of Policies. One can justify a wide range of policies
by using benefit-cost analysis because of the large uncer-
tainties in benefits and costs. Estimates of an “optimal”
policy weighing benefits and costs are in the range of $0
per ton to $40 per ton in 2005 with an expected value of
about $15 per ton.40 That suggests that some action on
climate change is probably justified provided that a large
number of developed and key developing countries par-
ticipate in an agreement. Yet, reasonable people are likely
to disagree markedly about the appropriate way to mea-
sure and quantify benefits and costs.41 Analysts are also likely
to disagree about whether benefit-cost analysis is the best
decision-making criterion for a problem with such large
uncertainties and long time horizons.42
Widespread Participation. Doing anything significant will
require widespread participation. While estimating the pre-
cise numbers of sources and sinks is difficult, they easily
number in the hundreds of millions (counting vehicles
alone) and are spread throughout the world. Moreover,
controlling sources or sinks in one small area may not make
any appreciable difference in the total level of emissions.
Suppose, for example, that several island nations concerned
with sea level rise agreed to freeze their greenhouse gas
emissions, but that all other countries continued business
as usual. That freeze would have virtually no impact on
40. See Nordhaus (1994). Nordhaus provides a range of estimates.
The tenth percentile estimate is $0 per ton; the ninetieth percentile
estimate is $37 per ton; and the median value is $6 per ton. The optimal
tax increases over time. In contrast to Nordhaus, Cline (1992) estimates
that an optimal tax would be in the range of $50 to $250 per ton. Cline’s
estimates are based on relatively high estimates of environmental dam-
ages and a low discount rate.
41. See Lave and Dowlatabadi (1993).
42. See Page (1978) and Arrow et al. (1996).23
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greenhouse gas emissions because those nations account
for such a small fraction of emissions.
Even if developed countries agreed to limit carbon di-
oxide emissions, the impact of such limitations is likely to
be relatively small over the long term for two reasons. First,
the emissions from the developing world are expected to
exceed those from the developed world in the coming cen-
tury. Between 1990 and 2050 non–Annex 1 emissions will
grow from under a third of the world total to 58 percent
while non-OECD emissions will grow from half the total to
74 percent.43 Second, some of the carbon-intensive indus-
tries could be expected to move to the developing world
because it would be cheaper to operate there. Estimates of
such “leakage” vary widely.44 For example, reasonable esti-
mates of the increase in carbon emissions outside the OECD
nations resulting from stabilizing OECD emissions at 1990
levels range from 1 percent to 25 percent of total abate-
ment in the OECD countries.45
Unilateral Action. Unilateral action by a small group of
countries is not likely to be in the narrow economic inter-
est of those countries, unless those actions serve to increase
the chances that a significant number of countries will even-
tually participate in such an agreement. Countries that ex-
43. See Martin et al. (1992). The Annex 1 countries include the OECD
countries, the former Soviet Union, and the countries of Eastern Europe.
44. The leakage rate is defined as the increase in emissions from non-
participating countries divided by the reductions by participating coun-
tries. For example, if the OECD countries reduced emissions by ten
tons and the rest of the world increased emissions by two tons, the leak-
age rate would be 20 percent. Leakage may also result if the demand
for carbon-based fuels increases from nonparticipating countries as the
demand drops in participating countries.
45. See Babiker, Maskus, and Rutherford (1997), Jacoby et al. (1997),
Oliveira-Martins et al. (1992), Manne (1993), and Manne and Martins
(1994). Estimates of leakage range widely—from negative to over 100
percent. See Pezzey (1991) for a particularly high estimate. Barrett
(1994) and Winters (1992) provide good surveys of the literature.24
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pect to benefit from warming gain no benefits from reduc-
ing greenhouse gases. Countries that expect to benefit from
reductions in worldwide greenhouse gases are likely to re-
ceive minimal benefits from unilateral or small-group ac-
tion because such action will have a minor effect on total
emissions. Countries such as the island states, whose sur-
vival is at stake, may pursue vigorous actions in hopes that
other countries will follow suit.
Cost-Effective Institutions. We need to design institutions
that can help achieve greenhouse gas reductions cost-
effectively. If action is taken on global warming, market-
based approaches have the potential to achieve reductions
cost-effectively. But the degree to which cost savings are
achieved depends critically on the design of such an ap-
proach. Economists are divided on the best approach to
that problem; nevertheless, a consensus is forming in the
economics community that we need to focus on designing
institutions that will help promote cooperation and achieve
greenhouse gas reductions at a “reasonable” cost.
Four particularly important policy insights emerge from
the review of the economics. First, the ubiquitous nature
of sources and sinks suggests that a coordinated response
to the problem will be necessary. Second, we can justify
some action now, provided we have a strategy for gaining
widespread participation in an agreement to limit green-
house gases. Third, institutional design, such as the ap-
proach taken to limit greenhouse gas emissions, can have
a dramatic impact on the cost of achieving particular envi-
ronmental goals. Fourth, global warming is a long-term






hile economics provides some important insights
into the nature of appropriate policies, an analy-
sis of climate-change politics can identify the
kinds of policies that are likely to be feasible—and not fea-
sible—and the kinds of actions different countries are likely
to take. Before identifying some of the political constraints,
it is instructive to review the evolution of climate negotia-
tions along with the key interest groups in that debate.
The primary vehicle used to promote cooperation on
the climate issue has been international negotiations. At the
June 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, 165 states signed
the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and 160 of
them ratified it over the next two years. That treaty called
for the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with the climate system.” In meet-
ing that goal the treaty requires developed countries and
countries in transition to begin national programs to report
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The target for devel-
oped nations is to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2000.
No limits were placed on other nations. Most developed
countries will not meet the target, in part because the agree-
ment lacks an effective enforcement mechanism.46 Notwith-
standing the failure to meet targets, the Berlin conference
46. See Cooper (1996).26
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in 1995 set more ambitious goals. In the Berlin mandate,
the nations agreed to strengthen their commitments and
put forth new, alternative targets, including a 20 percent
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005.47
In December 1997 over 150 countries met in Japan for
the Third Conference of the Parties to agree on specific tar-
gets and timetables for reducing emissions. The Kyoto Pro-
tocol requires differentiated commitments by the Annex 1
countries, with the ultimate goal of reducing emissions to
5.2 percent below 1990 levels in the period 2008 to 2012.48
The final agreement reflects the U.S. proposal to include
six gases instead of one or three.49 Countries will be able to
claim emissions reductions by reducing sources of pollution,
such as fossil-fuel combustion, or by increasing sinks, such
as forests, which absorb greenhouse gases from the atmo-
sphere. The protocol also includes a “Clean Development
Mechanism,” in which Annex 1 countries help developing
countries implement clean energy technologies and use any
resulting emission-reduction credits to meet their national
emissions target. The Clean Development Mechanism de-
scribed in the Kyoto Protocol is a kind of joint implementa-
tion program that a central body will oversee.50
47. See Richels et al. (1996) and Tucker (1997).
48. Individual commitments range from a 10 percent emissions growth
in Iceland to an 8 percent reduction in the European Union nations.
The United States agreed to reduce emissions by 7 percent.
49. The six gases covered are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous ox-
ide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride
as opposed to just carbon dioxide or carbon dioxide, methane, and
nitrous oxide. See Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997).
Nations will have the option of using 1995 as a baseline for
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride.
50. See Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997). A very
strong likelihood is that that central body will be subject to political
pressures that cause it to select some control strategies that are not cost-
effective. In addition, the central body will have multiple objectives, in-
cluding setting aside funds for countries that are most vulnerable to
climate change.27
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Some of the most contentious debate at the negotia-
tions centered on the instruments that will be used to
achieve national emissions targets. In the end, the impor-
tant issues of emissions trading and enforcement were post-
poned until the November 1998 meeting of the nations of
the world in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Although the U.S.
proposal of an international system of emissions trading
was not accepted in Kyoto, the protocol contains the prin-
ciple of using flexible, market-based instruments.51
Key interest groups in climate-change policy include
environmentalists, business, international negotiators, and
political leaders from developed and developing countries.
Environmentalists have a strong interest in arguing that
climate change is a very serious problem because of their
concerns for the environment and because it would en-
hance the influence of environmental advocacy groups.52
In contrast, most businesses have an incentive to under-
state the importance of that issue—particularly those busi-
nesses relying heavily on fossil fuels. At the same time,
businesses that are likely to be more directly affected by
the impacts of global warming, such as insurance and bank-
ing, can be expected to support action to limit greenhouse
gases.53
Another important group in the policy process com-
prises the international negotiators and bureaucrats, fre-
quently drawn from agencies dealing with diplomacy, the
environment, or both. Examples include staff representa-
tives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change Secretariat and the Global Environment
Facility. Those individuals usually have an incentive to over-
state the view of the narrow constituency or constituencies
51. The protocol contains clauses permitting countries to cooperate
in reaching their goals and to transfer emission reduction credits. See
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997).
52. See Lindzen (1996), Wildavsky (1992), and Hahn (1993).
53. See Warrick and Baker (1997).28
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that they represent. Justice Stephen Breyer refers to that
narrow perspective as “tunnel vision.”54 Such vision fre-
quently results in overemphasizing the importance of the
particular issue under consideration without thinking
through its broader implications for the economy and con-
sumers. That focus stems in part from benefits that accrue
to civil servants and appointed officials who negotiate those
agreements in the form of staff, travel, and promotions.55
The interests of nations vary dramatically. For example,
in most developing countries, the issue of climate change is
a relatively low priority compared with putting food on the
table. The impetus for doing something on climate change
has come largely from the developed countries and those
developing countries that expect to be at greatest risk. Other
developing countries, not surprisingly, have also encouraged
the developed countries to take significant action.
While the impact of key interest groups on climate-
change policy is complicated, it is possible to sketch some
important political features of the climate-change issue.
Here, I offer my views and predictions.
The Present Generation’s Interests. Political decision mak-
ing will tilt toward the interests of the present generation.
In general, politicians are motivated by short-term electoral
considerations and discount the long term more heavily
than economists would in analyzing benefits and costs. The
politicians will be more inclined to focus on the costs of
averting global warming, which could appear during their
tenure, and to discount heavily the benefits, which are far
off in the future. While there are exceptions to that rule, it
is probably true for most developed countries. Thus, al-
though it could be rational from an economic standpoint
for all nations to participate in an agreement now, it may
not be rational from a political standpoint. That is true
54. See Breyer (1993).
55. See Hahn and Richards (1989).29
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even if there were no free-riding problem because of how
politicians weigh benefits and costs over time.
Short-Term Strategy. A winning short-term strategy for de-
veloped country politicians is to talk tough on climate
change but to do relatively little. The appearance of doing
something can go a long way toward assuaging the con-
cerns of most citizens while helping to neutralize pressures
from environmental groups. Moreover, such a strategy will
be supported by many parts of the business community that
expect to bear most of the costs of controlling greenhouse
gas emissions. In justifying the strategy selected, politicians
are unlikely to cast the argument in terms of benefits and
costs; instead, they will appeal to emotional issues, such as
saving the planet.56
Existing Stakeholders’ Power. Any instruments used to re-
duce greenhouse gases are likely to be based in part on the
current distribution of political power. For example, if trad-
able permits are used in the United States, they are likely
to be “grandfathered” to existing producers or users of fos-
sil fuel. Thus, if there were a carbon permit market, oil
and coal producers could receive many of the permits. That
result suggests that revenue recycling options may be lim-
ited, even if they promote greater economic efficiency. In-
deed, to the extent revenues are recycled, such as in the
case of an emissions tax, a significant share may go to exist-
ing stakeholders.57
Costs to Developed Countries. If anything is done in the
short term, developed countries are likely to bear virtually
all the costs. That follows from the fact that climate change
is generally not a high priority for developing countries.
According to the World Health Organization, 4 million chil-
56. See Gore (1992) and Hahn (1993).
57. See Hahn (1989).30
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dren under the age of five died of air pollution–related
respiratory diseases in developing countries, and another
3.8 million died from diarrhea caused by polluted water.58
If the developed countries bear the initial costs, as ex-
pected, they will have to explain to voters why such expen-
ditures are warranted. Schelling makes the point that those
expenditures are likely to benefit mainly future citizens
from countries that will be relatively poor, but better off
than today’s poor.59 It may be difficult to justify such trans-
fers on political and economic grounds given the pressing
needs of today’s poor.
Likelihood of Significant Measures to Address Global
Warming. It is unlikely that anything significant on global
warming will be done for at least the next decade and pos-
sibly longer. That statement assumes that our understand-
ing of the economic benefits and costs of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions does not change dramatically.
The existence of the free-rider problem makes it highly
unlikely that most developed countries will find it in their
interest to do anything significant. Moreover, as noted,
developing countries do not see that issue as a priority.
Consider the case of the United States’ reducing emis-
sions to 1990 levels. A plausible estimate of the costs is in
the range of $100 per ton.60 That translates into an increase
in gasoline prices of roughly $.25 per gallon. Congress had
trouble passing legislation that resulted in a $.05 per gal-
lon increase. Thus, unless the costs are well hidden, Con-
gress is unlikely to approve such a target.
Outcome of International Negotiations. The most likely
outcome of international negotiations over the next de-
cade is that a select group of developed countries agrees to
58. See Easterbrook (1995).
59. See Schelling (1998).
60. See Dean and Hoeller (1992) and Nordhaus (1994).31
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do something that has a relatively low cost. The reason is
simple: developing countries have no incentive to sign an
agreement now unless the developed countries foot the
bill, and developed countries face no political imperative
to take drastic action. At the same time, the United States
could be held more accountable than other countries if it
signs an agreement with binding targets because environ-
mentalists may be more effective in using the U.S. legal
system to achieve their desired end.
The likelihood of an agreement with significant net
emissions reductions will increase with time, assuming that
climate change is still perceived as a problem. We can ex-
pect changes in technology to lower the cost of achieving
net emission reductions. Those include the development
of alternative energy sources and increased energy effi-
ciency. In addition, growth in world per capita income
should increase society’s willingness to pay for reducing
greenhouse gases, thus increasing political pressure to act.
Problem of Free Riding. Free riding is a major obstacle in
reaching an agreement where a large number of countries
must make significant reductions in greenhouse gases.
There is no way to force a sovereign country to participate
in an international agreement. A country is unlikely to
participate in an agreement unless it believes that its par-
ticipation will help bind other countries to an agreement
or unless it perceives that the costs of not participating are
unacceptable.61 In the case of a climate change, countries
will have a strong incentive either to free ride by not join-
ing the agreement or not to comply. The key to avoiding
such problems is structuring an agreement with appropri-
ate sanctions; unfortunately, that may be impossible in some
cases and not worth it in others.62
61. See Barrett (1997a) and Parson and Zeckhauser (1995).
62. See Barrett (1997b).32
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Credible Sanctions. Sanctions can help induce countries
to participate in an agreement, provided that they are cred-
ible. The precise nature of appropriate sanctions will de-
pend on the kind of agreement that is desired and the
general level of political support for an agreement. The
agreement needs to be self-enforcing in the sense that coun-
tries that are parties to an agreement are worse off if they
do not comply with or drop out of the agreement. That
property of self-enforcement hinges on devising a system
of rewards and sanctions that make it in a country’s inter-
est to remain in the agreement.63
For countries that sign an agreement, the sanctions for
not complying should increase gradually.64 Such sanctions
would make it easier to bring a country back into compli-
ance. Monitoring should also be transparent because that
makes it easier to impose sanctions when a country is out
of compliance and may put more pressure on the country
to comply. Table 3–1 shows examples of different ap-
proaches to the enforcement problem when economic in-
struments are used. Cooper effectively assumes that
enforcement will not be an issue for a tax if there is sup-
port for the treaty and if actions are transparent so that
they can be easily monitored.65 Dudek and Goffman and
Stewart, Wiener, and Sands suggest specific penalties in the
case of tradable permits.66 Tietenberg and Victor suggest
negotiating a mechanism for dispute resolution.67 Victor
63. The Montreal Protocol, which banned ozone-threatening chlo-
rofluorocarbons, has been successful by banning the import of con-
trolled substances and controlling nations’ access to international funds.
But significant differences exist between the Montreal Protocol and a
climate change agreement, including support from key industries, the
number of firms involved, and the cost of abatement. See Hahn and
McGartland (1989) and Victor (1997).
64. See Stewart, Wiener, and Sands (1996).
65. See Cooper (1996).
66. See Dudek and Goffman (1997) and Stewart, Wiener, and Sands
(1996).






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































argues that to gain compliance, the threat or use of trade
sanctions can alter countries’ behavior.68 On the basis of
the implementation of the Montreal Protocol to reduce
stratospheric ozone, he contends that linking international
aid from other sources to compliance also can be an effec-
tive enforcement mechanism.
One of the critical challenges for a climate-change
agreement is structuring sanctions for nonparticipating
countries. Many analysts have suggested that trade sanc-
tions may be necessary for nonparticipating countries. Such
sanctions have the potential to reduce free riding; they
could also escalate trade barriers, however. If, for example,
China and India chose not to comply with or participate in
an agreement, imposing trade sanctions could have very
large costs. Moreover, defining the precise form of the sanc-
tions will not be easy.69
The sanctions need to have teeth to be effective. Chayes
and Chayes have suggested that countries rarely violate
international treaties on purpose.70 Moreover, they argue
that strong sanctions can discourage participation in an
agreement. Both observations may be true for the agree-
ments they examine; but for treaties with high costs, such
as a greenhouse gas agreement with a stringent target, one
cannot assume that compliance will occur without sanc-
tions. The argument about the nature of sanctions affect-
ing participation rates is also valid and points to a limitation
of agreements. Indeed, one can imagine a voluntary action-
based treaty achieving more initially (in terms of green-
68. See Victor (1997).
69. See Dudek and Goffman (1997) and Stewart, Wiener, and Sands
(1996). One might like to define the sanctions in terms of the increased
greenhouse gases—that is, the damages—that arise as a result of coun-
try behavior. Those will be difficult to measure, even for carbon. One
possibility is to approximate the number of tons of carbon and multiply
that by a number at least as large as the price of permits (Nordhaus
1997).
70. See Chayes and Chayes (1995).36
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house gas reductions) than a treaty with enforceable limits
because countries may do more under an action-based
treaty if the costs turn out to be lower than expected. That
finding is consistent with the conclusions of Victor and of
Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff.71
Corruption. Corruption in some countries could pose a
significant problem. Consider a country with leadership
that does not make good on its promises related to climate
change. For example, imagine a country that is given an
allocation of tradable permits: the country could sell the
permits, and the leader could take the money and leave
the country after a coup. The country could then ignore
its previous obligations related to the sale of permits. Prob-
lems like those have solutions, such as deflating the value
of the permits from the seller country, but the solutions
could affect the integrity of the system if corruption occurs
on a large scale. Moreover, to the extent corruption is en-
demic to a political system, such as in some developing
countries, it is also likely to appear in the administration of
an agreement to limit greenhouse gases, where large wealth
transfers could be involved.
The preceding analysis of the politics reveals that the
range of “sensible” actions is likely to be severely con-
strained in the short term. At the same time, significant
room exists for fashioning an agreement within those
constraints.





he science of climate change suggests that it could
present a significant problem in the future, but not
immediately, because the cumulative buildup of
greenhouse gases is what matters. The economics suggests
that the problem may be worth addressing, but that a broad
coalition of the world’s countries will need to participate
in an agreement for it to be effective in significantly limit-
ing greenhouse gases. The politics suggests that the range
of instruments for addressing the issue is likely to be se-
verely constrained in the short term. Given that little is likely
to be done in the short term and given that climate change
is an important issue, the best approach over the next de-
cade is to build institutions that help set the stage for broad-
based action in the future, should it be necessary.72
A key question is how to develop a useful long-term
institutional capability at a modest cost. That depends on
the objectives of the institution-building exercise. One
objective could be to bring as many countries into an agree-
ment as possible so that they buy into the idea that address-
72. Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1997) show that even in a rela-
tively simple case where there was strong political will—the develop-
ment of the monitoring and modeling system for limiting transboundary
air pollution in Europe—it took more than a decade to build the neces-
sary international institutions.38
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ing climate change is worthwhile and begin building the
necessary institutions. A second objective might be to help
build the capability to enforce agreements with clear tar-
gets at a national and international level. A third objective
might be to learn more about the potential for making
cost-effective greenhouse gas reductions on an international
scale. The institution-building exercise needs to take place
primarily at the national level, given the constraint of na-
tional sovereignty.
More than the practitioners of any other discipline,
economists have focused on the institutional objective of
achieving greenhouse gas reductions in a cost-effective
manner. The evidence from application of economic in-
struments and from essentially every economic analysis of
the issue shows that those instruments can substantially
reduce the cost of limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Thus,
economic approaches should play a central role in the re-
sponse to climate change, and it is useful to think about
building institutions that will foster the development of
economic instruments.
Table 4–1 shows a range of proposals by economists for
addressing the climate-change issue. The table, while not
comprehensive, provides insight into the kinds of institu-
tional issues that the economics community is debating. One
of the fundamental issues addressed by those proposals is
the extent of coverage in an initial agreement—the number
of countries participating in an agreement and their respon-
sibilities. Schmalensee makes a cogent argument for an ap-
proach that includes as many countries as possible (broad),
but does not require major greenhouse gas reductions (shal-
low).73 The rationale for that approach is that getting a large
number of parties to agree to make a commitment now—
even a small commitment—is the most appropriate strategy
for building the depth and breadth necessary for a durable
institution to address climate change. The goal can be
73. See Schmalensee (1996).39
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changed later on as new information becomes available and
the demand for taking action changes.
Schmalensee contrasts the broad and shallow approach
with a “narrow and deep” approach implicitly advocated in
a draft protocol from the State Department.74 The protocol
calls for the Annex 1 nations, plus any others that wish to
join, to take significant actions now.75 Schmalensee suggests
that implementing a broad and shallow approach now, or at
least one that maximizes participation at a reasonable cost,
is the best way of getting to a broad and deep approach later.
The broad and shallow approach is appealing, but it
has a couple of drawbacks. First, it is unlikely to be feasible,
except in a very limited sense. The developing countries
are unlikely to participate unless they receive resource trans-
fers, such as through an initial allocation of permits. It is
hard to see the value of getting the developing countries
to sign an agreement that simply requires resource trans-
fers from the developed world unless a credible promise
can be extracted from them to do more later if the situa-
tion warrants. For example, in exchange for some trans-
fers now, the developing countries might agree to enter
into an agreement that requires more significant reduc-
tions as their per capita income rises beyond a certain level.
While that idea sounds appealing, one must question
whether future governments will feel bound by such prom-
ises. Second, as I argue below, there may be reasons to pre-
fer an agreement that is narrow for the purpose of learning
how to design institutions. In short, a broad and shallow
approach has the advantage of bringing many parties on
board (by definition), but I am not sure that that is such a
great advantage, since there is little assurance that many of
74. See Schmalensee (1997).
75. To the extent that leakage occurs and emissions grow more rap-
idly in the countries outside the protocol, countries may be asked to do
more later. That could increase their political resistance to joining an
agreement and could require relaxing their emission-reduction goals.40
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TABLE 4–1
POLICY PROPOSALS BY ECONOMISTS
Mechanism to
Author Instrument Coverage Decide Target
Schelling Agreed-upon OECD; China Uses abatement
(1998) actions that and India actions, not
can be mon- must be in- abatement
itored cluded soon targets
Schmal- A hybrid between Maximum par- Internationally
ensee a tax and a ticipation at negotiated
(1996) tradable per- an acceptable emissions tar-
mit; does not cost gets aimed at
prescribe dom- getting broad
estic policies participation
McKibbin System of nation- OECD now; Permits based
and Wil- al permits and hope to on historical
coxen emission fees expand emissions and




Cooper Agree on interna- All countries Agree on ac-






Nordhaus National tar- Partial partici- Targets updated
(1997) gets; coun- pation above on basis
tries choose $5,000 per of voting
domestic capita and mechanism
instruments full partici- that bal-
pation above ances costs




Level of Greenhouse International
Gas Target Trading Monitoring Enforcement
Not specified, but Not ad- Not ad- Not ad-
modest abate- dressed dressed dressed
ment now; more
later if necessary
Not specified, but Not ad- Ex ante in- International
modest abate- dressed ternation- public
ment now; more al evalua- opinion
later if necessary ation of
policies
Permits equal to No Individual Individual
1990 emissions; govern- govern-
actual emissions ments ments
expected to be
higher
Reduce projected No, but tax IMF could Individual
emissions 2% per should monitor govern-
year; in 2050 tax yield cost- ments;
would be $208 per efficient interna-
ton and emissions result tional
would be reduced pressure
25% from 1990
Not specified; it Yes Not ad- Carbon im-
would depend on ressed port duties
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those parties will participate in the future if they are asked
to bear significant costs.
Schelling takes a different tack. He argues for what
might be called a narrow and shallow approach.76 Unlike
Schmalensee, who calls for emission targets, Schelling be-
lieves that “targets and timetables” are unworkable at this
point because governments cannot easily be held respon-
sible for their nations’ emissions, which depend on many
variables, including random shocks. Uncooperative nations
would explain away their failure to meet stated goals as
bad luck.
Instead, Schelling argues for agreeing on a set of ac-
tions for which nations could be held accountable, even
though the impact of those actions on greenhouse gases is
uncertain. Those actions could be monitored by an inter-
national oversight entity more easily than actual emissions.
Schelling dismisses international tradable permits on the
grounds that if permits are allocated relative to a baseline,
no country will ever export any permits for fear that it will
provide grounds to reduce their allocation in future nego-
tiations. He also objects to distributing permits on a per
capita basis because the transfers would be huge.77 One
advantage of Schelling’s approach is that it is feasible. OECD
countries could specify actions and monitor them.
Another proposal in the “narrow and shallow” category
is by McKibbin and Wilcoxen, who advocate a system of
tradable domestic permits with a fee collected by national
governments for their own use.78 The fee would put an ef-
fective cap on the cost of emission reductions by placing
an upper bound on the price of a permit.79 Their proposal
76. See Schelling (1998).
77. See Schelling (1992).
78. See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997).
79. For example, if the fee were $10 per ton, the permit price would
never exceed that amount because firms would simply pay the fee in
lieu of purchasing a permit.43
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does not allow international trading because they believe
that the huge transfers between countries are politically
infeasible and undesirable. I think that such a proposal
represents a step in the right direction because it is fea-
sible; it does little, however, to develop the institutional
architecture needed for enforcing agreements among
nations.80
Cooper argues for a broad and incremental approach
using emission taxes, steadily reducing carbon emissions
from projected increases by an additional 2 percent per
year.81 He contends that tradable permits are not feasible
because it will be politically impossible to agree on a
baseline. Cooper’s critique of international tradable per-
mits also applies to his own tax proposal. It is hard to see
how a taxation approach would be feasible in the short
term for the developing world, unless the tax were set very
low and the developed countries paid for most of it. Coo-
per argues that developing governments will embrace the
tax as a revenue source. Of course, nothing would prevent
them from auctioning the permits to obtain revenues.
Nordhaus advocates a broad agreement but recognizes
that that may not be feasible in the short term.82 He sug-
gests linking the level of participation to a country’s per
capita income. Specifically, Nordhaus advocates that coun-
tries set national emission targets. Countries would be
allowed to meet them by using their own choice of instru-
ments. A novel feature of Nordhaus’s proposal is that it
calls for revising the overall target periodically by using a
voting mechanism that would help balance benefits and
costs. While the details need to be worked out, as Nordhaus
80. For a very similar, more recent proposal, see Kopp, Morgenstern,
and Pizer (1997), who highlight the potential improvements in welfare
that could result from such a policy. Their proposal does not explicitly
address international trading.
81. See Cooper (1996).
82. See Nordhaus (1997).44
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notes, the general idea of revising targets over time while
taking into account benefits and costs is intriguing.
The preceding proposals serve to underscore the rich-
ness of ideas swirling around the economics community
on the climate-change issue. I believe that all the proposals
have merit, and I do not have a single preferred proposal.
But I do have a conceptual framework that I would like to
offer for thinking about the problem. Within that frame-
work, I would also like to offer some proposals that I think
are worthy of consideration.
The framework involves experimental institutional de-
sign. In the best of all worlds, we would like to learn how to
design adaptive institutions that can address the climate-
change issue in a sensible manner. As a social scientist, I
would like to conduct a series of controlled experiments
on planet Earth. We might, for example, choose to com-
pare policies suggested in table 4–1 in terms of their effi-
ciency, equity, and environmental impact.
If we could run such experiments, what might they look
like? One might feature voluntary targets; a second might
feature a taxation system; a third might feature a tradable-
permit system; a fourth might feature a tradable-permit
system with a tax that places an upper bound on costs. The
permutations are virtually endless and could include dif-
ferent rules on international trading, gases covered, moni-
toring approaches, and enforcement regimes. The
important point would be to design the experiments to
shed light on key elements of institutional design.
Of course, in the real world, we do not have the luxury
of conducting a series of controlled experiments that would
yield the kind of clean information on institutional design
that social scientists crave. At the same time, we could have
the opportunity to learn from some uncontrolled case stud-
ies. Social scientists should explicitly address the kind of
case studies they think are most useful within realistic po-
litical constraints. For example, if the United States is wed-
ded to a tradable-permit approach, it should be allowed to45
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83. See Schelling (1998). That proposal is similar to a proposal from
the European Union calling for the coordination of policies and mea-
sures. See Schmalensee (1997). But the European Union has maintained
that such coordination should be legally binding, although in practice
it might be easier—and more consistent with Schelling’s proposal—to
coordinate through nonbinding agreements. See Victor (1997).
pursue that; if the Europeans wish to use a standards-based
approach or a combination of standards and taxes, they
should be allowed to do so. Moreover, different regions,
such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, need not
have similar reduction targets. The key is to help shape
those case studies in a way that allows for learning.
Researchers need to be explicit about the goals of the
case studies as well as performance measures. I believe that
it is important to learn how different market-based systems
perform under relatively hard emission targets that involve
more than one country. That line of inquiry is important
because significant actions on climate change, if they are
required, should be achieved in a way that does not waste
hundreds of billions of dollars.
Six suggestions for possible case studies appear in table
4–2. All involve a few developed countries, and in two cases,
a few developing countries as well. They include a sugges-
tion for coordinated policies and measures along the lines
proposed by Schelling;83 a modest tax; a tradable-permit
approach with a few developed countries; a tradable-permit
approach with a few developed and developing countries;
a tradable-permit approach along with joint implementa-
tion in a few developed and developing countries; and a
hybrid approach that incorporates both taxes and tradable
permits (described in more detail below). The case studies
would be designed to impose modest costs on the partici-
pating countries. Important aspects of each system, such as
precise emission targets and taxes, monitoring, and enforce-
ment regimes, are not specified and would need to be
worked out.46



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The cases would provide different kinds of insights, as
the table suggests. For example, coordinated policies could
yield information on the possibility of getting significant
reductions from agreed-upon actions. The tax system could
provide insight into the problems with harmonizing taxes
across countries, if we assume that to be a goal of the sys-
tem.84 The tax system could also provide insight into pos-
sible efficiency gains and losses associated with actual revenue
recycling. The tradable-permit approaches could give insights
into the potential of joint implementation, the problems
associated with enforcement, and possible debasement of
the currency.85 All systems could be helpful in improving
the information base on inventories. If data were collected
on administrative costs, those could be compared across dif-
ferent approaches. Finally, the relative merits of different
approaches may become more readily apparent.
Note that the preceding set of case studies need not
require a binding agreement across nations; but such an
agreement might be helpful in encouraging the developed
countries to experiment with a variety of approaches. It
could also be helpful in setting broad parameters related
to the expected cost of the system.
Such a case-study approach underscores the need to
design national institutions. Those national institutions are
crucial if novel market-based mechanisms are to be imple-
mented effectively. Most of the existing literature on insti-
tution building suggests the need to focus on international
institutions.86 Yet action at the national level matters most,
84. Countries may take steps to undercut the effectiveness of a harmo-
nized carbon dioxide tax by reducing other taxes on fossil fuels, which
will raise prices less than the full amount of the new carbon tax. The
government could also subsidize complements to fossil fuels or raise taxes
on substitutes to lessen the impact of the agreement on the economy.
See Hoel (1992). Less well appreciated is that countries could adopt simi-
lar policies to reduce the effectiveness of a tradable permit system.
85. See Wiener (1997).
86. See Chayes (1991) and Chayes, Skolnikoff, and Victor (1992).48
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even though there is obviously a need for some kind of
international institution as well.
One objection to that experimental or case-study
method is that it is unlikely to be politically acceptable. In
many ways though, the case-study approach is more accept-
able than adopting a single approach to limiting green-
house gases. Many groups are wary of supporting large
institutional reforms, such as a large-scale tradable-permit
or harmonized-tax approach. For example, political sup-
port for international tradable permits or even for joint
implementation with credits remains lukewarm. The case-
study approach allows practical demonstration of the ben-
efits of those approaches without first requiring all nations
to agree. More important, it permits the ironing out of
design details before committing major economies to po-
tentially costly and practically irreversible effects. Finally,
the case-study approach need not be an excuse for taking
no action to regulate emissions—if it were, then it would
encounter significant political resistance.
The case-study approach would take into account the
interests of particular countries. For example, the Scandi-
navian countries, which have already implemented carbon
taxes, could continue on that path, perhaps working on
harmonization issues. The United States and other coun-
tries interested in tradable permits or a hybrid system could
use that approach. Other European countries may want to
try a combination of regulation and market-based ap-
proaches. The key is to design studies that take account of
the political constraints while promoting learning about
the design of robust institutions.
To advance the case-study approach, one could have
an agreement that includes the developed countries and
any developing countries that wish to join.87 The key would
87. In principle, one could conduct the case studies without any
overarching agreement; I believe, however, that participation would be
less likely.49
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be to allow individual countries and groups of countries to
tailor instruments to their economic and political needs.
The agreement could center on verifiable actions that coun-
tries agree to take and could also include binding commit-
ments.88 Those actions would include not only concrete
measures, such as plans to change power sources, but also
instruments, such as those suggested in my case studies.89
The overarching agreement could also call for extensive
review of the case studies.
The case studies presented in table 4–2 are quite broad.
Table 4–3 considers one proposal in more detail that is
really a variant of the last case study shown in table 4–2.
That hybrid proposal includes emission targets, interna-
tional tradable permits, and a price floor and a price ceil-
ing on emission permits.
Fixed targets are central to learning how to monitor
emissions and enforce agreements. Trading internation-
ally is critical for learning how to trade across nations to
help achieve a given goal at a lower cost. A novel feature of
such a proposal is its reliance on both a ceiling price and a
floor price for permits. Acting as a safety valve, a ceiling
price on permits would limit the costs imposed on partici-
pating countries and businesses.
I would not make that price higher than $10 per ton.90
The ceiling price effectively limits the maximum price of a
88. See Schelling (1992) and Victor (1997). A relevant precedent for
such an agreement is the North Sea regime. See Victor, Raustiala, and
Skolnikoff (1997).
89. If the case-study approach is not feasible among countries, it may
be feasible within a country such as the United States. One might want
to consider the potential for learning about different institutions by
having groups of states experiment on a voluntary basis with different
approaches to limiting greenhouse gases.
90. If one is interested in ensuring that the tradable-permit price will
be binding, it may be necessary to use a higher ceiling price. A tax of
$10 per ton translates to about $.024 per gallon of gasoline, but it would
apply to all major sources of carbon dioxide and not just to gasoline.50
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permit to that value. Conversely, a floor price limits the
minimum price of a permit. That price, which could be set
around $1 per ton, would ensure that the system was op-
erational, even if the initial emission targets turned out not
to be binding.
The remaining parts of the proposal address monitor-
ing and enforcement issues. Sources of carbon dioxide from
fossil-fuel combustion are the focus initially because that is
the part of the problem that is most easily monitored.91
The provisions to extend the agreement to other gases and
sinks would encourage the development of new monitor-
ing technologies. Making information readily available on
emissions can be a useful way of encouraging compliance
with the agreement and also assessing the effectiveness of
TABLE 4–3
PROVISIONS OF TRADABLE PERMIT PROPOSAL
WITH PRICE CEILING AND PRICE FLOOR
Fixed domestic emissions targets at a level thought to be
binding (e.g., at 1997 emission levels)
International tradability of permits among the countries
participating in the agreement
A ceiling price and a floor price on permits
A focus on sources of carbon dioxide initially, with an
agreement on conditions under which sinks and other
gases could be included
Readily available information on the emissions of coun-
tries and market participants
An agreed-upon enforcement mechanism that has teeth
91. See Victor (1991).51
ROBERT W. HAHN
the agreement. The enforcement mechanism would con-
sist of a set of graduated sanctions, beginning with a fine.92
Thus, the effective price ceiling would be raised for non-
complying nations.
A fundamental issue relates to the credibility of the
enforcement mechanism—that is, making countries and
firms believe that they will have to incur significant costs in
the case of noncompliance. That problem has no simple
solution. It will inevitably involve a willingness on the part
of individual nations to give up some degree of control
over their policies—as is currently done with trade policy.
Specifically, some policing mechanism and some cen-
tral organization will be needed to aid with enforcement
in the case of noncompliance. The nature of that governing
body is likely to be an extremely sensitive issue. I envision
such a body’s emerging slowly, as knowledge concerning
emissions, control costs, and institutional mechanisms
evolves. In the short term, countries could agree to self-
enforcement with reporting and see how that works.
Finally, serious thought needs to be given to the finer
structure of that and other proposals, including the nature
of monitoring and enforcement. Consider the problem of
monitoring carbon dioxide in the energy sector that most
schemes propose to address. Table 4–4 shows some pos-
sible choices for the U.S. energy sector. The task for policy
makers is to minimize the costs of administration, moni-
toring, and enforcement while ensuring that the system’s
environmental goals are achieved. It is clear from the table
that it makes sense to focus on some point upstream rather
than on the millions of users downstream.93 One may not
want to focus on the point furthest upstream, however. For
example, in the case of natural gas, it may make more sense
to monitor and enforce at some points in the pipeline net-
92. For example, if the ceiling price were $10 per ton, the fine on
excess emissions could be $15 per ton.
93. See Hahn and Richards (1995) and Smith et al. (1992).52
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work or at the processing plants; for oil, refineries repre-
sent a logical monitoring point; and for coal, a logical point
is at the coal mine. The most efficient system will depend
on the specific objectives of the policy maker.
The goal over the next decade or two should be to learn
how to design institutions that are capable of addressing
the climate problem on a large scale if significant actions
are desired in the future. The goal should not be to imple-
ment the lowest-cost system right now, but rather to intro-
duce approaches that will help develop sensible policies in
the future.
Some may object to the seemingly modest emission-
reduction goals embodied in the case studies. I recommend
that approach on the basis of political considerations as
well as an interest in developing durable institutions. Con-
sider two instructive analogies—the evolution of a free trad-
ing system and the possible emergence of a European
monetary union. Rules and institutions governing free trade
among nations have been evolving for several decades. A
European monetary union involves a smaller group of
countries and a higher level of political support than the
climate-change issue, yet there are huge practical problems
in implementation.94
Policy makers and analysts have barely examined—
much less agreed upon—the details of economic instru-
ments for addressing climate change, such as currency,
trading rules, and rules for changing the rules.95 Thus, if
one wants a workable system, it makes sense to start small.
And since we do not know how best to start, why not try a
few case studies?
94. I am indebted to David Victor for that example.
95. Many papers on the subject of economic instruments in that area
exist, but good “how to” manuals that work out the details of enforce-
ment and monitoring are virtually nonexistent because the problems
are quite formidable—with respect not just to market-based approaches
but to all approaches.55
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It is of some practical interest to compare and contrast
the case-study approach here with the Kyoto Protocol de-
veloped in late 1997. The case studies recommended here
are consistent with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in allowing
individual countries freedom to decide how best to achieve
emission reductions. The studies differ from the protocol,
however, in terms of the stringency of the targets. I fear
that by setting stringent targets, the designers of the proto-
col may deflect attention away from the more fundamen-
tal problem of building durable institutions. Politicians are
likely to make largely symbolic gestures rather than to en-
gage seriously in the quiet work of building the necessary
institutions.96
The case-study approach suggested here implicitly rec-
ognizes that no single instrument dominates all others. We
can expect institutions to have different strengths and weak-
nesses both economically and politically. It would be in-
structive to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses
of those approaches as they actually perform in the real
world.
96. The administration’s proposed $6.3 billion package of tax cuts
and research and development investments over the next five years may
provide a good example. See Bureau of National Affairs (1998).56
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5
Conclusion and Areas for Research
A
 common thread runs through the recent econom-
 ics literature and political economy literature on
 climate change. The economics literature generally
suggests that at the current time we have no reason to panic
and take drastic action to reduce greenhouse gases. The
political economy literature suggests that such action is in-
feasible because of the serious problems in getting coun-
tries to cooperate. Scholars disagree, however, about the
kind of approaches that should be taken in the short term
and the countries that should be involved.
After reviewing some of the key economic and politi-
cal factors likely to affect a climate-change agreement
among nations, I have suggested an approach primarily
involving developed countries that would be useful in build-
ing institutions to address climate change. The approach
rests on two ideas: first, action is likely to occur now only if
the developed countries pay the bill; and second, it is best
to learn about the development of institutions for address-
ing climate change through a case-study approach.
The case-study approach is appealing because it pre-
serves diversity and builds useful institutional experience
and knowledge. The last thing we should be doing now, in
our state of ignorance about the warming problem and
institutional responses, is to narrow the range of response
mechanisms. Thus, the case studies I suggest cover a fairly57
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wide range but focus on the development of cost-effective
approaches for limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
In a sense, the suggestion by several economists that
countries be allowed to decide for themselves on specific
actions or goals is an implicit endorsement of the case-study
approach.97 But I believe that most case studies should in-
volve binding constraints, because they would eventually
be needed if climate change is perceived as a serious issue
meriting a serious response.
My approach builds on Schmalensee’s insight concern-
ing the need to think about the design of institutions for
addressing climate change.98 It differs from Schmalensee’s
in its primary focus on developed countries and on the
design of multiple cases or experiments. The policy design
I suggest also borrows from Schelling, who argues for a
shallow approach centered on developed countries.99 My
approach differs from Schelling’s design primarily in my
emphasis on learning about the properties of market-based
approaches for addressing climate change.
One of the messages of this volume is that policy makers
should not set their sights excessively high, given the politi-
cal constraints on getting countries to participate in an agree-
ment. It is safe to say that the solution that maximizes
collective net benefits for climate change is unlikely to be
attained in the short term, even if there were agreement on
the nature of that solution, which there is not. Moreover, no
obvious target or focal point around which parties can easily
coalesce exists. The goal of stabilizing emissions at 1990 lev-
els was once advanced as an initial target, but that goal has
no strong economic, political, or scientific appeal.
This volume has argued that in the near term it is im-
prudent to take significant action and that such action is
97. See Schelling (1992), Hahn and Stavins (1995), and Schmalensee
(1996).
98. See Schmalensee (1996).
99. See Schelling (1992).58
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unlikely to occur. An agreement among developed coun-
tries is feasible if it is not inordinately expensive. Persuad-
ing developing countries to reduce greenhouse gases in
the current political environment without providing sub-
stantial side payments to induce allegiance to the common
goal will be very difficult. Yet it is possible and appropriate
to think through important choices in the structuring of
agreements and institutions so that nations can better ad-
dress the climate-change issue over the next century.
Academics and policy makers should begin to engage
the institutional design question more seriously. So far, most
academics have focused on a single preferred case without
considering the possibility of addressing more than one. I
believe that there could be great gains to the case-study
approach suggested here, especially if the cases were de-
signed to take account of political constraints.
Designing institutions that can achieve significant
greenhouse gas reductions from a number of countries will
be a formidable task. Although we have been at that task
for only a decade, some innovative approaches have already
emerged. Experimenting with market-based approaches for
environmental control as well as coordinated policies and
measures will make the task easier. Designing those ap-
proaches will be difficult because enforcement capabilities
and political interest vary tremendously across nations.
Experience strongly suggests that it is not reasonable to
expect to achieve a particular greenhouse gas goal in a least
costly manner. Nonetheless, a wide range of options exists,
some of which are likely to be much more costly than oth-
ers. It behooves countries to explore the low-cost ones now.
The best way to learn about the potential of market-based
designs is to consider implementing some case studies. In
addition, one can build on the practical experience that
has been gained from those approaches.100
100. See Hahn (1989), Stavins (1997b), and Joskow and Schmalensee
(1998).59
ROBERT W. HAHN
While this volume identifies a particular set of cases for
building institutions, we need to continue to make progress
in several other areas to aid in institutional design. First
and foremost, we need to develop a better inventory of
emissions of greenhouse gases. That would include sources
of emissions as well as “sinks” such as forests that store
emissions. Second, we need to make that information
readily available to interested parties. Low-cost information
on emissions by country and source could serve as a pow-
erful tool for encouraging countries to comply with an
agreement.
In addition, we need to couch the institutional design
issue more broadly in terms of a portfolio of investments
that could best address the climate problem. Manne and
Richels characterize the problem in terms of “finding the
right blend of options.”101 It is also important to continue
investing in research that will provide a better understand-
ing of the climate problem, research that fosters new tech-
nologies, and research that sheds light on the merits of
different strategies for adaptation.102
It is also useful to continue research on key political
and institutional factors that will make it easier to attain a
more far-reaching agreement if one is necessary. Clearly,
as countries become wealthier, they are more likely to find
it in their interest to address long-term problems. But, be-
yond that, we need to design agreements so that countries
have an incentive to participate. The nature of feasible car-
rots and sticks deserves further study.103
Institutions should not only strive to be cost-effective;
they should also help to produce and adapt to new infor-
mation. We must achieve a delicate balance. One would
like to be able to change the rules periodically but still get
101. See Manne and Richels (1997).
102. See Lave (1988), Toman (1997), and Tucker (1997).
103. See, for example, Barrett (1997a), Victor (1997), and Victor,
Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1997).60
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people to take actions that are based on sound science and
economics.
As Nordhaus notes, climate change is truly “the grand-
daddy of all public goods.”104 But it is not without solutions.
In the short term, the strategy is clear: help design institu-
tions that can better respond to the problem.
104. See Nordhaus (1991).61
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